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Recent Decisions
Copyrights Infringement. Continental Casualty
Company v. Beardsley, 253 F. 2d 702 (2d Cir. 1958). Defendant insurance broker developed a system for insuring
against the loss of securities by means of a blanket bond.
This system was published in a six page pamphlet which
contained a copyright notice. Plaintiff insurance company
brought a declaratory judgment proceeding to have the
copyright on three pages of the pamphlet judged invalid.
The material in question sets forth certain insurance forms
to be used in the implementation of defendant's plan. The
District Court held such insurance forms were not properly
copyrightable and that even if they were, there was no
infringement.
In reversing the District Court's finding as to the copyrightabiity of the matter in question, the Circuit Court
distinguished the present case from Baker v. Selden, 101
U.S. 99 (1879). In the Selden case the Supreme Court upheld a copyright on an explanation of an accounting system but refused to permit the copyrighting of the system
itself. In the present case the explanation of the system
was incorporated in the forms themselves and thus the
system and explanation were inseparable. Assuming the
copyrightability of such forms, the question of the amount
of protection to be given remains. In the fields of commerce
and insurance great latitude is allowed in permitting others
to use almost the specific language of copyrighted documents without holding that an infringement has occurred.
The primary consideration of the court in determining
how much similarity of language is to be allowed turns on
the probable effect which the copyright would have on the
public's use of the idea beneath it. If the effect of prohibiting similarity of language would be to give the copyright
owner a monopoly on his ideas, and thus to prevent the
public from using the idea, then the cases uniformly deny
protection to the copyright holder. Dorsey v. Old Surety
Life Ins. Co., 98 F. 2d 872 (1st Cir. 1938), Crume v. Pacific
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 140 F. 2d 182 (7th Cir. 1944). If the
public can easily utilize the idea beneath the copyrighted
language without resorting to repeating it, the copyright
holder will, of course, be protected. In the present case,
although the Court held defendant's copyright valid, it
ruled plaintiff had not infringed it by using similar language. The Court went on to state that the defendant had

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XVIII

lost his copyright through a subsequent general publication. Thus it is apparent that one may possess a perfectly
valid copyright on a documented form where the explanation of a copyrighted system is embodied in the form, and
yet receive little or no protection against others who adopt
similar language in their forms.
Criminal Law - Mandamus - Lifting Of Detainer.
Baker v. Marbury, 216 Md. 572, 141 A. 2d 523 (1958). Appellant was confined in a federal penal institution in Virginia
before he could be tried by a Maryland state court on the
charge of breaking into a storehouse. Prior to his being
incarcerated appellant had been indicted by the grand jury
of Prince George's County, Maryland, and after his incarceration in the federal reformatory, the Prince George's
County Sheriff placed a detainer against him with the
federal penal authorities. In the present proceeding appellant requested the Chief Judge of the Seventh Judicial
Circuit of Maryland to issue a writ of mandamus directing
a Circuit Court Judge of Prince George's County to lift
said detainer. In affirming the lower court's rejection of
this request the Court of Appeals held that the Circuit
Court lacked authority to cause a sheriff either to place or
lift the detainer. The Court, in commenting upon the lower
court's ruling in an earlier habeas corpus proceeding which
appellant had brought, stated that no Maryland judge could
require the federal penal authorities either within or outside this state to produce the prisoner for trial in a Maryland state court.
In ruling on defendant's contention that he was being
denied a speedy trial by the Circuit Court for Prince
George's County, the Court of Appeals found that the defendant had failed to show negligent or deliberate delay
on the part of the State in pressing the prosecution. The
Court distinguished the present case from the case of Petition of Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (1955), affirmed without
opinion, 350 U.S. 857 (1955), by pointing out that the undue
delay was found there because of the deliberate and improper choice of venue by the U.S. government which was
held to have resulted therein. Despite this finding, the
Court seemed to leave the question of any possible future
delay for future determination, when it quoted with approval the following remarks made by Chief Judge Gray
in the lower court's opinion, namely: ". . when the case
is ready for trial a decision can then be made as to whether
the defendant should be required to stand trial" [575].
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The right of an incarcerated person to demand a speedy
trial is discussed in Harrisv. State, 194 Md. 288, 71 A. 2d 36
(1950). There the court noted that the right to a speedy
trial was a personal right which could be lost by the failure
to demand it. In this instance the failure of a prisoner to
demand a speedy trial rendered the guarantee of a speedy
trial, pursuant to Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights and of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, inapplicable. The court stated the Maryland
view in the Harris case when it said:
"... we adopt the rule that in a case like the one
before us it is the duty of the incarcerated person to
demand a speedy trial of an indictment pending against
him in any of the courts of this State, and if he fails
to demand such a trial he waives his right to a speedy
trial" [297]. See also 118 A.L.R. 1037; 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law 726, 727, Sec. 472.
Taxation - Subjection Of Reserved Life Estates To
Inheritance Tax. Register of Wills v. Blackway, 217 Md. 1,
141 A. 2d 713 (1958). Four parcels of land were conveyed
to plaintiff by his 92 year old stepfather and his 86 year
old mother in consideration of which plaintiff was to take
care of said grantors until their death. By the deed of conveyance the grantors reserved life estates in the land in
themselves. Defendant Register of Wills contended that
this conveyance was subject to the collateral inheritance
tax on real estate. Defendant relied upon MD. CODE (1951)
Art. 81, §150 [now 7 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 81, §151] which
imposes an inheritance tax on "all tangible or intangible
property, real or personal, passing either by will or under
the intestate laws of this State, or by deed, gift, grant,
bargain or sale, made in contemplation of death, or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
the death of a decedent ......
The Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower Court's judgment that the transfer in
question was exempt from the inheritance tax set forth in
the above Code section. Plaintiff maintained that the transfers of property were exempt from said inheritance tax
on the ground that the transfers came within an implied
exemption extended to cover transfers from a decedent
which had been "executed pursuant to a binding agreement in which an adequate and valuable consideration has
passed to the decedent in an amount equal in value to the
property transferred".
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In holding that this transfer fell within the specified
exemption the Maryland Court of Appeals quoted 25 Op.
Atty. Gen. 678 (1940) which set forth the requisites necessary for application of the exemption, i.e., the transfer
must be made in fulfillment of a binding contractual obligation, based on a consideration reasonably commensurate
with the value of the property transferred and the consideration must be received or enjoyed by the decedent
during his lifetime [9]. In addition to these requirements
the agreement or contract must be clearly established or
defined. Plaintiff's mother died within 2 years after the
plaintiff commenced caring for his parents. The property
transferred by decedents was appraised at about $14,600.
Defendant contends that 2 years care of decedents is not
an adequate consideration within the meaning of the requirements set forth in the exemption. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the consideration was "reasonably commensurate with the value of the property transferred" by
holding that the evaluation date of the consideration was
the date of the agreement for transfer and not the date of
the deaths of the grantors. This finding was largely based
upon implications drawn from 30 Op. Atty. Gen. 229 (1945),
31 Op. Atty. 247 (1946), and 31 Op. Atty. Gen. 262 (1946),
in the latter of which the assumption of contingent liability
as accommodation parties on a note by transferees of property from a decedent was regarded as a consideration commensurate with the value of the property transferred and
therefore within the tax exemption.
See 85 C.J.S., Taxation 913, 914, Sec. 1147 (1), 28 AM.
JuR., Inheritance, Estate and Gift Taxes, 97, Sec. 183 and

99 A.L.R. 949, 951.
Taxation - Willful Failure To Pay Federal Income
Tax. United States v. :Palermo, 58-2 U.S.T.C. f9850 (3rd
Cir. 1958). Defendant was convicted in a California District Court of willfully failing to pay his federal income
tax on time, although he had filed his income tax returns
promptly. The Court found as a special finding of fact pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 23(c),
28 U.S.C.A. (1958) 146, that defendant's failure to pay his
tax on time was "willful" within the meaning of INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE of 1939, Sec. 145(a) and INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE of 1954, Sec. 7203. 'These sections provide for imposition of a fine and/or imprisonment for anyone who "willfully fails to pay" his federal income tax on time. The District Court's finding of "willfulness" was based largely on
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the fact defendant had failed to pay his income tax on
time for nine consecutive years, and that during this time
defendant made luxury expenditures at times when he was
in default on his income tax. The District Court stated that
where a man has knowingly and intentionally defaulted
in paying his income tax for nine times in succession "the
conclusion is inescapable, in the absence of any substantial evidence to the contrary, that this series of defaults
arose from an evil motive". United States v. Palermo, 157
F. Supp. 578, 582 (E.D. Pa. 1957). The Circuit Court of
Appeals rejected the lower court's finding on the ground
that the District Court used improper legal criteria in making its determination that defendant's conduct constituted
"willfulness" within the meaning of the statute. The District Court had relied upon part of a definition set forth in
United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933), where the
Supreme Court talked of willfulness as denoting an act
done "without justifiable excuse . . ., stubbornly, obstinately, perversely, ... " [394]. The Court of Appeals based
its decision on previous definitions of willfulness set forth
in Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492 (1943) and United
States v. Martell, 199 Fed. 2d 670 (3rd Cir. 1952), cert.
den. 345 U.S. 917 (1953), which emphasized the "evil
motive" aspect of willfulness.
Adopting a somewhat limited definition of willfulness,
the Appellate Court stated:
"Willfulness is an essential element of the crime
proscribed by §145(a). It requires the existence of a
specific wrongful intent - an evil motive - at the
time the crime charged was committed; viz, failure
to pay the tax due at the time required by law. A series
of defaults, indicating a pattern of behavior, knowingly and intentionally made, may suggest the existence of the specific 'evil motive'. Mere laxity, careless
disregard of the duty imposed by law or even of gross
negligence unattended by 'evil motive' are not probative of 'wilfulness'." [p. 69, 495].
It thus becomes apparent that the taxpayer who continually fails to pay his federal income tax on time will be
given the benefit of the doubt in all but the most incriminating of circumstances.
Torts - Assumption Of Risk. Lee v. National League
Baseball Club of Milwaukee, 4 Wis. 2d 168, 89 N.W. 2d 811
(1958). Plaintiff, a 69 year old woman, bought a seat in an
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unscreened part of the grandstand for a baseball game in
Milwaukee County Stadium. Plaintiff sustained injuries
when she was pushed off her chair and trampled upon by
other spectators, who were attempting to recover a foul
ball. Defendant contends inter alia that the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury through collisions with foul ball
seeking spectators by purchasing her seat in the unscreened
portion of the stadium. The appellate court affirmed the
lower court's ruling that the evidence presented a question
of fact whether the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury
by voluntarily accepting a seat in the area of the park
which was unprotected by screens.
The Court, while recognizing the doctrine of voluntary
assumption of a known risk, noted that the only risks that a
patron of a baseball game assumes are those risks of danger which are a matter of common knowledge to the
patron. The Court also recognized the line of cases which
have held that a spectator who accepts a seat in an unscreened area of a ball park assumes the risk under ordinary circumstances of being injured by a batted ball. The
present case was distinguished from these cases on the
ground that the defendant maintained a staff of ushers,
who the plaintiff might assume would prevent the type of
rough-house tactics that occurred. This factor, coupled
with the fact that no injuries had been sustained by any
patron prior to the plaintiff's being injured, as the result of
a foul ball scramble negatived the application of the assumption of risk doctrine. Defendant's negligence was
predicated upon its removal of an usher who had been
guarding the box seat where plaintiff was sitting just prior
to the time that plaintiff sustained her injury.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has not ruled on the
extent to which a spectator assumes risk of injury at sporting events. Gordon v. State Fair, 174 Md. 466, 199 A. 519
(1938), appears to be the case most nearly in point. There
a spectator at a race track was deemed to have assumed
the risk when he stood up on a chair furnished by defendant and later was knocked off his chair by the crowd
around him. See also 142 A.L.R. 868, 16 A.L.R. 2d 912,
20 A.L.R. 2d 8.
Torts - Imputed Contributory Negligence. York v.
Day's Inc., 140 A. 2d 730 (Me. 1958). Plaintiff's less-thaneighteen-year-old son was driving plaintiff's automobile on
a personal mission when his car collided with an automobile driven by defendant's servant. Plaintiff-bailor brought
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suit against defendant to recover for damages to his car.
Defendant asserted that the contributory negligence of
plaintiff's bailee-son was imputable to plaintiff-bailor and
thus barred his recovery. Although at common law a
bailor-father is not liable for the negligence of his baileeson while said bailee is engaged in a personal mission, a
Maine statute provides that every owner of a motor vehicle permitting a minor under 18 years of age to operate
it upon a highway shall be jointly and severally liable
with such minor for any damage caused by the negligence
of this minor. Defendant maintained that this statute not
only imposed liability upon auto owners who allowed
minors to operate their cars, but also imputed the contributory negligence of such minor-bailee to the motor vehicle
owner so as to bar said owner from recovering damages
from a negligent third person.
The appellate court in denying the imputability of the
contributory negligence of plaintiff's son to the plaintiff,
and thus upholding plaintiff's recovery, based its decision
on the legislative intent of the Maine legislature in enacting the statute in question. The Court relied upon RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) Sec. 485, and the caveat to this section
in its opinion. The RESTATEMENT imputes contributory negligence of a third person to a plaintiff where the plaintiff
himself would be responsible at common law to others for
the negligent acts of such third person; but in a caveat to
this section the Institute expresses no opinion whether
such contributory negligence may be imputed where a
statute imposes vicarious liability for harm negligently
caused to others by third persons for whose conduct said
plaintiff would not at common law be responsible.
In construing the Maine statute strictly, since it is in
derogation of the common law, the Court found that the
statute's purpose was not to impute a driver's contributory
negligence to bar the owner's recovery but merely to give
to persons injured by the negligent operation of automobiles a better chance for effective recovery by making the
registered owner take out insurance to cover his possible
liability for his bailee's negligence.
In Price v. Miller, 165 Md. 578, 169 A. 800 (1934), the
Maryland Court held that the negligence of a bailee of an
automobile did not bar the recovery by the bailor from a
third party whose negligence also contributed to the accident. This decision rested on the common law rule that the
negligence of the driver of a car resulting in damage to a
third party is not a proper basis for recovery against the
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owner of the car, unless at the time of the accident the
driver was the agent or servant of the owner engaged in
the owner's or master's business.
In 1943, Maryland passed an imputability of negligence
law similar to the Massachusetts statute; 6 MD. CODE (1957)
Art. 66%, Sec. 93(b):
"Any negligence of a minor under the age of twentyone (21) years when driving a motor vehicle upon a
highway in this State shall be imputed to the person
who has signed the application of such minor for a
permit or license, and that person shall be jointly and
severally liable with such minor for any damages
caused by such negligence .... "
Although the effect of this statute upon imputability of
contributory negligence to a bailor has not yet been
brought in issue, indications are that the Price rule is still
in effect. In Sklar v. Southcomb, 194 Md. 626, 630, 72 A.
2d 11 (1950), the Price case was cited in some dicta to the
effect that the contributory negligence of a bailee is still
not imputable to the bailor in the absence of a master servant relationship. See 16 Md. L. Rev. 174 (1956).
Torts - Slander Publication. Walter v. Davidson, 214
Ga. 187,104 S.E. 2d 113 (1958). Defendant, the president of a
college of which the plaintiff was a student, allegedly
uttered a slanderous statement directed toward the plaintiff
in the presence of another faculty member. The remarks
were supposedly spoken during the course of an investigation involving stealing in one of the college's dormitories.
The party in whose presence these remarks were said to be
made was a faculty member of said college assigned to
student disciplinary problems. The appellate court held
that even if defendant had uttered slanderous remarks and
these remarks were heard by the faculty member present,
no publication of the slander had taken place. The court
reasoned that members of a college faculty charged with
the maintenance of student discipline enjoy a privilege
similar to that which a parent possesses in disciplinary
actions involving his child.
See 78 A.L.R. 1182 for publication among members
of a family.
Unauthorized Practice Of Law - Corporations. State
Bar Ass'n. of Conn. v. Connecticut Bank & T. Co., 145
Conn. 222, 140 A. 2d 863 (1958), 21 Conn. Supp. 42, 144
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A. 2d 347 (1958). Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment
determining that defendants' acts constitute the unlawful
practice of the law, and an injunction restraining the same.
The acts in question were: distribution of estate planning
and estate taxation information to prospective customers;
drafting and filing customers' petitions, accounts, and
various other papers in probate court; preparation and
filing customers' federal and state tax returns; dealing
with examiners of the internal revenue service, and entering appearances and representing customers at probate
court hearings.
The trial court found that in all but one of these activities, i.e., defendants' representation of customers at probate hearings by persons not admitted to the bar, defendants had not committed acts which amounted to unlawful
practice of the law, within the meaning of the Connecticut
statute [CoN. GEN. ST. (1949), Secs. 7638, 7641]. On appeal the Supreme Court of Errors held that the trial court
erred in concluding as a matter of law, that the practices
complained of did not constitute the unlawful practice of
law. This difference in the holdings of the lower and appellate courts stemmed from their respective views with regard to the Connecticut statutes governing the practice of
law and those authorizing corporations to engage in trust
work. The lower court held the latter statutes paramount.
The appellate court held that defendants could engage in
the trust business only if they observed the requirements
of the statutes governing the practice of law, namely, that
in carrying on what is "commonly understood to be the
practice of law", on behalf of others, trust companies could
only act through attorneys who were not employees of
said trust companies. Further, that any attempt by the
legislature to authorize corporations to practice law would
be unconstitutional because violative of Connecticut's separation of powers of government.
On remand of the case, 21 Conn. Supp. 42, 144 A. 2d
347 (reprinted, Daily Record, Oct. 10, 1958), the lower
court issued a sweeping injunction prohibiting the Trust
Companies, their officers, employees, agents or servants
from taking any steps in the administration of an
estate where "the legal rights, liabilities or interests of any
estate or trust or of any parties interested therein are to
be adjudicated, defined, determined, compromised or settled by any decree, judgment, order or ruling of any Probate Court or of the state tax department or of the internal
revenue service . . . ." [144 A. 2d 347, 352]. The matter is

360

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XVIII

again on appeal from this injunction to the Supreme Court
of Errors of Connecticut.
Maryland has statutes similar to those of Connecticut
with respect to the admission of attorneys and the practice
of the law by persons not attorneys. 3 MD. CODE (1957)

Art. 27, Sec. 14, and 1 MD.

CODE

(1957) Art. 10, Sec. 32. The

former makes it unlawful for any corporation or voluntary
association to solicit employment in connection with the
furnishing of legal advice, services, or counsel of any kind
whatsoever. It also forbids corporations to hold themselves
out as competent of furnishing legal services. Art. 27,
Sec. 14, excepts from its application:
".... the business of examining and insuring titles
to real property, or the collection or adjustment of
mercantile claims in which a corporation or voluntary
association may be lawfully engaged, nor to any insurance corporation or association defending the insured
under a policy of insurance."
Only one Maryland case has arisen in this area. In
Rehm v. Coal Co., 169 Md. 365, 181 A. 724 (1935), Art. 10,
Sec. 32, which makes it a criminal offense for a person
who has not been admitted to the bar to receive reward for
services as an attorney at law, and Sec. 33, which makes
it a crime for one not a member of the bar to represent
himself as entitled to practice, were held not to preclude a
collection agency, acting as agent for the plaintiff in the
People's Court, from signing the praecipe to which was
attached an itemized statement of plaintiff's damages and
also appearing in the People's Court and providing plaintiff's claim.
For a discussion of the problem, see 2 Md. L. Rev. 342;
73 A.L.R. 1327, 105 A.LIR. 342, 114 A.L.R. 1506, 157 A.L.R.
282; 5 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, Attorneys at Law §§3,

17, 25; 5

LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBLEMS,

1-174 (1938); 16

Md. L. Rev. 352 (1956). Cf. "Statements Of Principles With
Respect To The Practice Of Law Formulated By Representatives Of The American Bar Association And Various
Business And Professional Groups", sections of which on
"Collection Agencies", "Insurance Adjusters", and "Realtors" were reprinted in the Daily Record of October 7,
October 27 and November 18, 1958.

